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ADmALTY-JURISDIcTION--DEA.TH ON SHOE FRoT INJUrtY RECIVmh ON
HIGH SEAs..The deceased, a cattle tender on a British ship, was injured
on the high seas, and died on shore some hours later. A libel was brought
by his widow seeling recovery either from the decedents employers or the
owners of the ship. Held, that the libel be dismissed, intcr alid, on the
ground that since the Federal Death Act of March 30, 1920 (41 Stat. at L.
537) gives a right of action only at the moment when death occurs, the
cause of action arose on land and hence the admiralty court was without
jurisdiction. Pickles v. F. Leyland & Co. (1925, D. Mass.) 10 Fed. (2d)
371.
When the negligence which causes an accident resulting in death or injury
occurs in one state or country and the accident itself in another, the law
of the latter place governs. Chicago, St. L. & N. 0. R. Co. -e. Doyle (183)
60 Miss. 977; Cameron. v. Vandcrgriff (1890) 53 Ark. 381, 13 S. W. 1092.
If the injury occurs in one state, and death results therefrom in another,
the cause of action is regarded as having arisen in the former state. Rud-
iger v. Chicago, St. Paud Ry. Co. (1896) 94 Wis. 191, 68 N. W. 61; ef.
Hoodmacher v. Lehigh. Valley Ry. Co. (1907) 218 Pa. 21, 60 Atl. 975; Cool:,
The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33 YLE Lwi
JouRNAL, 457, 466. And so where death is the only operative fact occurring
within a state the wrongful death statute of that state does not irnpoze
responsibility. Needham ,v. Grand Tunkd Ry. Co. (1865) 38 Vt. 294; Louis-
ville & Nashville Ry. Co. v. Williams (1896) 113 Ala. 402, 21 So. 938; Van
Doren v. Penn. Ry. (1899, C. C. A. 3d) 93 Fed. 260. Similarly, admiralty
has no jurisdiction if the fatal force is applied to the victim on land, though
put in motion by negligence on navigable waters. Cordrey v. Tie Bec
(1921) 102 Or. 636, 201 Pac. 202; Biinzgs v,. Breinig (1881) 45 Mich. 65,
7 N. W. 722; Alartin v. West (1911) 222 U. S. 191, 32 Sup. Ct. 42; Lcrmoind's
Case (1923) 122 Me. 319, 119 AtI. 864. Conversely, admiralty has juris-
diction when the fatal force is applied on navigable waters, although the
causation was a negligent act on shore. Hermaunn v. Port BlaI;cly 31Mil1 Co.
(1895, D. Calif.) 69 Fed. 646. And if the fatal force is applied to the body
of the deceased on navigable waters, admiralty has jurisdiction even though
the death occurs on shore. The Chiswick (1910, C. C. A. 5th) 231 Fcd.
452; Liverani v. John, T. Clark & Son (1919, Sup. Ct. Spe. T.) 176 X. Y.
Supp. 725; The Samnauger (1924, S. D. Ga.) 298 Fed. 620; The A7,9lo-
Patagonian (1916, C. C. A. 4th) 235 Fed. 92; Campbell v. Lz:ckc bVTcI: S. S.
Co. (1925, D. Or.) 5 Fed. (2d) 874. However, a few cases, including the
instant decision, have held that if the death occurs on land admiralty has
no jurisdiction. The Kaian Mar, (1924, D. Or.) 2 Fed. (2d)
121 (apparently overruled though not cited by the decision in
Campbell v. Lucken back S. S. Co., szpra); Rylcy -e. Philgdel-
phia & R. Ry. Co. (1909, S. D. N. Y.) 173 Fed. 839. This minority doc-
trine is based upon an interpretation of the Federal Death Act which makes
the death the wrongful act for which the action is given on the theory that
the statute is not a surviral satute but a death statute. Hughes, Death
Actions in Admiralty (1921) 31 YALE LA W JOunNAL, 115, 120; Hughes, Ad-
miralty (2d ed. 1920) 236. But what seems to be the better view is that the
application of fatal force to the body of the victim should be the gist of the
action. Under this view the Federal Death Act would apply when death
occurs on land from an injury at sea. Magruder and Grant, Wrongful
Death within the Admiralty Jurisdiction (1920) 35 Y= LA i Joun,;AL,
[1007J
1008 YALE LAW JOURNAL
395; Benedict, Admiralty (5th ed. 1925) sec. 142. It is submitted that the
purpose of the framers of the Federal Act has been frustrated by the de-
nial of admiralty jurisdiction in the instant case. As it is probable, in view
of the above cases, that no recovery dan be had for the wrongful death under
.the Massachusetts Death Act, the result would seem to bar all recovery.
Cf. The Sagamore (1917, C. C. A. 1st) 247 Fed. 743; Needham V. Grand
Trunk Ry. Co., supra.; Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co. v. Williams, supra.
APPEAL AND ERROR-CONNECTICUT PRACTiCE-GENERAL VERDIcT-EFFECT
OF ERROR AS TO ONE OF SEvERAL ISSUES.-In an action by the plaintiffs to
recover a commission, the defendant offered evidence to show (1) that the
defendant never 6mployed the plaintiffs, (2) that the plaintiffs did not pro-
cure a customer. No special interrogatories were requested. Exception
was taken by the plaintiff to a part of the charge to the jury dealing with
the second defense. The jury returned a general verdict for the defend-
ant. Held, on appeal, that the judgment on the general verdict be affirmed;
and, by way of dictum, that appeal can be taken from error in the trial
of one of several independent issues only when proper interrogatories have
been offered for submission to the jury. Spring v. Nagle (1926) 104 Conn.
23, 131 At. 744.
Connecticut and a very few other states have always followed the rule
that a general verdict will stand, although error has intervened in the
trial of one of several independent issues. Aaronson v. New Haven (1920)
94 Conn. 690, 110 Atl. 872; (1920) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 197. While
this rule was definitely established after full argument in the early cases
of Louis v. Niles (1792, Conn.) 1 Root 433, and Wolcott v. Coleman (1817)
2 Conn. 324, and while it has never been overruled, it probably has been ap-
plied only occasionally by the court for it seems to have been but little appre-
ciated by the bar. Thus in some of the more recent leading cases where this
rule has been applied, the point was not argued by counsel in their briefs,
or, as far as any intimations in the opinions show, argued at all. Foster v.
Smith (1885) 52 Conn. 449, Briefs and Records, 1st Jud. Dist. Jan. Term.
1885; Aaronson v. Now Haven, supra, Briefs and Records 3rd Jud. Dist.
Jan. Term 1920; Spring v. Nagle, supra, Briefs & Records 1st Jud. Dist.
Jan. Term. 1926. Recently the court has suggested methods for avoiding
the effect of this rule. Thus, in the instant case reference is made to
Callahan v. Jursek (1924) 100 Conn. 490, 124 Atl. 31, where the court said
that the proper procedure is to request separate verdicts on separate counts,
or answers to special interrogatories on separate issues in one count. But
it would seem that an attempt to have the jury make special findings of
fact generally perplexes the jury more, results in more mistrials through
inconsistencies, and does less substantial justice than a general verdict.
Sunderland, Verdicts General and Special (1920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
253. Furthermore, this suggested procedure conflicts with the formerly ac-
cepted Connecticut rule that the submission of interrogatories is solely
within the discretion of the trial court. The common law use of special
verdicts adopted by statute (Conn. Gen. Sts. 1918, sec. 5789) had fallen
into disuse by 1822. 1 Swift's Digest (1822) 774. But interrogatories had
been frequently allowed in the ordinary jury cases at the trial cour's dis-
cretion until finally the rules were laid down in Freedman v. New Yorl,
N. H. & H. Ry. Co. (1909) 81 Conn. 601, 71 Atl. 901. There it was stated
that interrogatories could only be used at the discretion of the court. (1922)
Conn. Prac. Bk. 298, sec. 236. But in those cases where there are several
issues, the submission of interrogatories to the jury is said to be a matter
of right and not of discretion. Callahan v. Jursek, supra. In that case the
action of the trial judge in refusing requested interrogatories was sus-
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tained on the ground that they were not so framed as correctly to separate
the issues and conclude each issue by an answer. The future procedure in
Connecticut may possibly be: (1) A continued application of the rule that
a general verdict imports that all points were found in favor of the pre-
vailing party. While this rule may, in certain cases, prevent reversals on
technicalities, yet it forces requests for special interrogatories, thus neces-
sitating decisions as to whether in a given case the interrogatories as of-
fered properly separate and conclude tfe issues. (2) In reaction to such
technical distinctions the general trend of practice may be for the trial
courts to submit interrogatories as a matter of course when and in the
form offered. This would burden and confuse the jury contrary to con-
siderations of policy above stated. (3) Practical disregard of the rule as
applied in the instant case and the development of a practice to grant a
new trial whenever there is error as to a material issue.
BILs AND NoTEs-DnswEw WHO WAS ALso DRA mR, PAYuG MUAsED
CHECK, CANNOT RECOVER OVERPAYMENT.-A United States disbursing offi-
cer drew a check upon the Treasurer of the United States. The check was
raised from $47.50 to $4750. The defendant received payment of the raised
amount through the Federal Reserve Bank, the agent of the Government.
On learning of the alteration, the United States sued to recover the dif-
ference. On demurrer, judgment was rendered for the defendant. The
plaintiff appealed. Held, that the judgment be affirmed for when the United
States issues an order upon itself, it has notice of the amount, and by
payment admits correctness of the amount paid. Tite United State. v. The
National Exchange Bank of Baltimore (1926) U. S. Sup. Ct., Oct. Term,
1925, No. 222.
At common law, a drawee who paid or who accepted and paid a draft
admitted the drawer's signature. Price v. Neal (17G2, K. B.) 3 Burr. 1354;
White v. Continental National Bank (1876) 64 N. Y. 316. But he did not
admit the genuineness of the indorsements or of the body of the instrument.
Espy v. Bank of Cincinnati (1873, U. S.) 18 Wall. 604 (raised check);
Carpenter v. Northborough National Bank (1877) 123 Mass. 66 (forged in-
dorsement); see Redington v. Woods (1873) 45 Calif. 406, 419. Through
legislation, the acceptor, by accepting an instrument makes certain admis-
sions and binds himself to pay "according to the tenor of his acceptance."
N.I.L. see. 62. But this has been held not to change the above common law
rules. First Nat. Bank of Portland v. United States Nat. Bandk (1921)
100 Or. 264, 197 Pac. 547; First State Ban: & T. Co. v. First Nat. Banh of
Canton (1924) 314 Ill. 269, 145 N. E. 382; cf. South Boston Trvnst Co. v.
Levin (1924) 249 Mass. 45, 143 N. E. 816 (denying that the NJ.L. Sec.
62 covers "payment" and basing the decision strictly on the common law
rule of Price v. Neal, supra.) And thus, banks have recovered moneys over
forged indorsements. Interstate Trust Co. v. United States Nat. Ban
(1919) 67 Colo. 6, 185 Pac. 260; cf. Jones Broa. v. Citize. INat Ban
(1925) 106 Okla. 162, 233 Pac. 472; First Nat. Banlz of Wichita Falls v.
Guaranteed State Bank (1925) 106 Okla. 85, 233 Pac. 183 (recovery denied
because of negligence on the part of the drawee bank). And also moneys
paid out on raised checks. McClendon v. Bank of Advance (1915) 188 Mo.
App. 417, 174 S. W. 203; National Reserve Bank of N. Y. v. Corn Exchange
Bank (1916, 1st Dept.) 171 App. Div. 195, 157 N. Y. Supp. 316 (check
had been certified for the raised amount) ; see Central N'at. Bank v. Drostcn
Jewelry Co. (1920) 203 Mo. App. 646, 658, 220 S. W. 511, 514 (forged
indorsement and raised amount); cf. Citizens' Bank of Winfield v. Com-
mercial Say. Bank of Guin (1923) 209 Ala. 280, 96 So. 324 (raised sight
draft); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Mellon Ban; (1923) 276 Pa. 212, 119
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Atl. 910. But in case of acceptance after the alteration of the payee's
name.it has been held that the common law rule is changed by N.I.L. Sec.
62 and the acceptance admits the payee's name appearing at the time of
acceptance. National City Bank v. National Repub. Bank (1921) 300 Il1.
103, 132 N. E. 832; COMMENTS (1922) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 522 (approv-
ing); NOTES (1922) 16 ILL. L. Rnv. 615 (disapproving). There is some
disposition, although it is believed to be without basis, to hold that certif-
ication also binds the drawee to pay a raised amount if it appeared at the
time of certification. See Ozark Savings Bank v. Bank of Bradleyvillo
(1918, Mo. App.) 204 S. W. 570, 571. The instant case, without inter-
preting the N.I.L., reaches a similar result in a case involving payment
rather than acceptance, but appears to rest the decision on the circum-
stance that the United States was both drawee and drawer. Although this
is contrary to the rule obtaining where drawee and drawer are different per-
sons, it has support in analogous cases denying recovery to the maker of a
note where payment has been made by mistake. Bank of United States v.
Bank of Ga. (1825, U. S.) 10 Wheat. 333 (raised bank notes); Johnston v.
Commercial Bank (1885) 27 W. Va. 343 (forged maker's signature); see
Jones v. Miners' & Merchants' Bank (1910) 144 Mo. App. 428, 435, 12&
S. W. 829, 830 (forged maker's signature); cf. Franklin Bank v. Raymond
(1829, N. Y.) 3 Wend. 69 (mistake as to whether holder is a holder in due
course) ; contra: Welch v. Goodwin (1877) 123 Mass. 71 (forged maker's
signature).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-CommUTATION OF SENTENCE-CHANGE: FROM DEATH
SENTENCE TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT NOr PERM'ISSIBLE AS A MITIGATION OF
PUNISHMENT.-The petitioner was convicted of murder in Alaska in 1905
and sentenced to death. In 1909 the President "commuted" the punishment
from execution to life imprisonment. The petitioner brought suit for a
writ of habeas corpus. Held, that the writ be granted on the ground that
the "commutation" was beyond the President's power, since it was not a
mitigation of, but an illegal change in the nature of punishment. Ex parto
Perovich (1925; D. Kan.) 9 Fed. (2d) 124.
A commutation is the substitution by authority of law of a
lesser for a greater punishment. See State v. Wolfer (1914) 127 Minn.
102, 103, 148 N. W. 896, 897. It differs from a pardon in that no ac-
ceptance is necessary for its validity, and it may be imposed upon the
prisoner without his consent. Lee v. Murphy (1872, Va.) 22 Gratt. 789;
of. Chapman v. Scott (1926, C. C. A. 2d) 10 Fed. (2d) 690. The power to
commute a sentence is a part of the pardoning power, and may be exercised
under a general grant of that power. Ex parte Wells (1856, U. S.) 18 How.
307. Some courts have held statutes changing the punishment of certain
crimes from death to life imprisonment to be ex post facto as to crimes com-
mitted before the passage of the statute on the ground that they did not
mitigate, but imposed an entirely different punishment. Shepherd v. Peo-
ple (1862) 25 N. Y. 406. However, most courts have held such a statutory
change valid as a mitigation of punishment. Commonwealth v. Wyman
(1853, Mass.) 12 Cush. 237; MeGuire v. State (1899) 76 Miss. 504, 25 So.
495; see People 'i. Hayes (1894) 140 N. Y. 484, 492, 35 N. E. 951, 953;
Hall, Constitutional Law (1923) 94. Similarly, a "commutation" of a
death sentence into one of life imprisonment by an executive, such as was
attempted in the instant case, has been upheld under the pardoning power.
Peopk v. Frost (1909, 2d Dept. )133 App. Div. 179, 117 N. Y. Supp. 524;
see State v. Olander (1922) 193 Iowa, 1379, 1382, 186 N. W. 53, 54; contra:
Ex parte Janes (1865) 1 Nev. 319. In Ex parte Janes, supra, the court,
having, granted the writ of habeas corpus, ordered the petitioner to be re-_
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tained in custody under the original death sentence. Quacre, whether the
absence of such an order would set the petitioner free. If so, the interpre-
tation of "mitigation of punishment" given in the instant case seems
undesirable.
CoNsTrrTUmoNAI LAW-INHERITANCi TAx-GIrS-CoNcLUsrE Pn :stmp-
TiON OF CON miPL oT0N oF D-TH.--A Wisconsin statute declared that
every transfer of a material part of an estate, made within six years prior
to the death of the transferor, without adequate compensation, should be
construed to have been made in contemplation of death, and therefore
within the provisions of the Inheritance Tax Law. The deceased, with-
out an actual apprehension or contemplation of death, transferred five
million dollars to the plaintiff within the prescribed period. The plaintiffs
challenged the validity of the statute, but the Supreme Court of the State
held it constitutional. Held, on appeal, (three judges dissenting) that
since the statute arbitrarily made it a conclusive presumption that such
gifts were made in contemplation of death, it was in conflict with the
Fourteenth Amendment. Schlesinger et al. v. State (1920) U. S. Sup. Ct.,
Oct. Term, 1925, No. 146.
Inheritance taxation, in theory, is not a direct tax on property, but a
tax on the privilege of transmitting property at death. Corbin v. Baldwin
(1917) 92 Conn. 99, 101 AtI. 834; In re Gihon's Estate (1902) 169 N. Y.
443, 62 N. E. 561. As such, obviously, it cannot apply to gifts which have
no relation to death either in point of time or intention, since such gifts
are beyond its purpose and scope. Cf. Conway's Estate v,. State (1018,
Ind.) 120 N. E. 717. There would seem to be no constitutional objection
to state legislation designed to tax gifts generally. In at least one country,
gifts and legacies bear identical taxes. See Law of Germany, Sept. 10,
1919, Reichsgestzblatt, 199, No. 173, pp. 1543, 1557. It is generally con-
ceded that inheritance taxation can be extended to include gifts made "in
contemplation of death." Merrifield v. People (1904) 212 Ill. 400, 72 N. E.
446; Magoun v. Illinois Trust a2zd Savings Bank (1898) 170 U. S. 283, 18
Sup. Ct. 594. What will amount to a gift made in contemplation of death,
involves questions of fact. Estate of Bcnton (1908) 234 Ill. 360, 84 N. E.
1026. And since the only persons who could testify on this point are
usually those who would be directly benefited by proving it was not such
a gift, great difficulty was found in enforcing this provision of the in-
heritance tax statutes. Cf. Matter of Price (1009) 0 Misc. 149, 110 I. Y.
Supp. 283. Statutes, such as the one in the instant case, specifying a
definite time within which gifts would be deemed to have been made in
contemplation of death, were enacted in order to remedy this difficulty
and thus prevent evasion of the Inheritance Tax. Cf. Gleason and Otis,
Inheritance Taxation (3d ed. 1922) 123. The scope of these statutes clearly
would include some cases where gifts within the prescribed period were
made without actual apprehension or contemplation of death. But, as
Mr. Justice Holmes points out in his dissent in the instant case, "the law
allows a penumbra to be embraced that goes beyond the outline of its ob-
ject in order that the object may be secured." Cf. Purity Eztra t and
Tonic Co. v. Lynch (1912) 226 U. S. 192, 33 Sup. Ct 44; Jacob Ruppert
v. Caffey (1920) 251 U. S. 264, 40 Sup. Ct. 141 (unintoxicating malt liquors
prohibited in order to make effective a prohibition of the sale of beer).
Moreover, a legislature and state court, familiar with local conditions and
aware of the abuses which the statute was designed to remedy, considere
the six year period reasonable and necessary to give the statute practical
force. The view of the dissent, therefore, in hesitating to pronounce it
unreasonable and arbitrary seems justified.
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CONTRACTS-CON5sDERATION-PROMISE TO SELL "SuRPLU."-The defend-
ant agreed to sell all of its surplus stock of steel sheets and bars to the
plaintiff, the quantity to be stated by the defendant. Plaintiff brought an
action on the contract and the court directed a verdict for the defendant.
Held, on appeal, that the judgment be affirmed as the contract was "unen-
forceable for want of mutality," the seller having retained the power to
declare the amount of the surplus. Midland Steel Sales Co. v. Waterloo
Gasoline Engine Co. (1925, C. C. A. 8th) 9 Fed. (2d) 250.
If either party to a bilateral agreement retains an option which renders
his promise illusory, there is no contract because of lack of consideration.
Wickham & Burton Coal Co. v. Farmers' Lumber Co. (1920) 189 Iowa,
1183, 179 N. W. 417 (option to buy any quantity desired); A. Santaella
& Co. v. Otto F. Lange Co. (1907 C. C. A. 8th) 155 Fed. 719 (similar op-
tion). The ambiguous phrase "want of mutuality" as used in the instant
case means.lack of consideration. 1 Williston, Contracts (1920) sec. 140;
(1921) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 297. Where the option is limited, the
promisor may be said to be under a new detrimental legal relation, and
the contract is therefore held to be supported by a valid consideration.
Lima Locomotive etc. Co. v. National Steel Castings Co. (1907, C. C. A.
6th) 155 Fed. 77 (contract to buy of defendant all of the "requirements"
of plaintiff's business); Scott v. Moragues Lumber Co. (1918) 202 Ala.
312, 80 So. 394 (contract to charter boat to the plaintiff if the defendant
purchased it); Gurfein v. Werbelovsky (1922) 97 Conn. 703, 118 At]. 32
(cbntract of sale with option to cancel before shipment) ; Burgess Sulphito
Fibre Co. v. Broomfield (1902) 180 Mass. 283, 62 N. E. 367 (contract to
sell to defendant all the scrap iron plaintiff wished to sell) ; Corbin, Effect
of Option on Consideration (1925) 34 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 571; Patterson,
"Illusory" Promises and Promisors Options (1921) 6 IOWA L. BULL. 129,
209; contra: Velie Motor Car Co. v. Kopmeier Motor Car Co. (1912, C. C. A.
7th) 194 Fed. 324 (contract of sale with option to cancel). Some courts
have held that there was no contract where the quantity was not ascer-
tainable with reasonable certainty otherwise than by optionee's statement.
Bailey v. Austrian (1873) 19 Minn. 535; cf. Wells v. Alexandre (1891)
130 N. Y. 642, 29 N. E. 142 (buyer bound to take quantity otherwise
ascertainable at the time the contract was made). Other courts have hold
that the duty not to buy of, or sell to, any other party is in itself a valid
consideration. Burgess etc. v. Broomfield, supra; Bartlett Springs Co. v.
Standard Box Co. (1911) 16 Calif. App. 671, 117 Pac. 934. In the instant
case, the seller had a limited option between selling surplus to the plaintiff
and managing his business so as to have no surplus. "Surplus" is as
objectively determinable as the "requirements" of a business, and the fact
that the optionee is to submit statements of this quantity should not affect
its objective determination. Lima Locomotive etc. Co. v. National etc. Co.,
supra, (buyer to tell seller amount of his "needs"). The defendant's
promise was, therefore, not illusory and should have been sufficient con-
sideration to make the contract binding.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-COURT'S POWER TO MITIGATE SENTENCE! ENDS
WHEN PUNISHMENT BEGINs The defendant pleaded guilty to the crime
of unlawfully making mash, and was sentenced to serve a year in the
penitentiary. After the execution of the sentence had begun, the court
during the same term at which sentence was pronounced, set it aside and
ordered the prisoner discharged. The plaintiffs, members of the State
Board of Correction, refused to obey the order, and petitioned to quash a
judgment on habeas corpus commanding the defendant's release. Held
(two judges dissenting) that the judgment be quashed, since to vacate the
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original sentence after its partial execution would put the defendant in
jeopardy twice for the same offense. Emerson, v. BoyIks (1926, Ark.) 280
S. W. 1005.
A court is usually said to have inherent power to modify its own judg-
ments during the same term at which they are rendered. 2 Bishop, New
Crimizal Procedure (2d ed. 1913) see. 1298; see Kug -v. Prico (1805, K. B.)
6 East, 323, 328; Holden v. State (1923) 156 Ark. 521, 527, 247 S. W. 763,
770. But in cases where the court has sought to revise its judgment and
increase the penalty, it is held that after the sentence has been partially
or fully executed, the court is without power to change or amend it.
Ex parte Lange (1874, U. S.) 18 Wall. 163; Pcople -v. Mescrvcy (1889)
76 Mich. 223, 42 N. W. 1133; State v. Mcycr (1912) 86 Kan. 793, 122 Pac.
101. The reason assigned is that to permit a second sentence under
these circumstances would be to punish the prisoner twice for the same
offence, in violation of his constitutional rights. See Ex partc Lange,
supra, at 168; Smith v. District Court (1906) 132 Iowa, 603, 607; 109
N. W. 1085, 1087; People v. Sullivan (1907) 54 Misc. 489, 490, 106 N. Y.
Supp. 143, 144. However, the constitutional prohibition against double jeop-
ardy would seem properly to apply only to trying a man twice for the same
offence. Cf. Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick (188S) 121 Pa. 109, 116, 15 At].
466, 469; 1 Bishop, Criminal Law (9th ed. 1923) sec. 979; Comley, Former
Jeopardy (1926) 35 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 674, 675. Hence that does not ap-
pear to be a sound argument against empowering a court to modify cen-
tences already in execution, by vacation or substitution of sentence in
diminution of punishment. Thus it has been held that a court has power
to mitigate its sentence though it has been partially executed. In re
Brittain (1885) 93 N. C. 587; see Plain v. Stato (1878) 60 Ga. 234, 28;
Ammon vi. Johnson (1888) 3 Ohio Cir. Ct. 263. This doctrine, the basis
of the dissent in the instant case, is established in the federal courts. See
In re Graves (1902, E. D. Wis.) 117 Fed. 798, 799.
CRIanNAL LAW-VERDIcT ON SINGLE COUNT APPinErPTLY INCONSISTEN:T
WITH VERDICT ON OTHER CoUNTs NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR.-The defendant
was indicted on four counts. The first charged unlawful possession of in-
toxicating liquor; the second, unlawful possession of apparatus for its
manufacture; the third, unlawful manufacture, and th fourth, maintain-
ing a common nuisance as defined by the Volstead Act (maintaining a place
for the illegal manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquors). The same evi-
dence was relied upon by the prosecution on all four counts. The jury
found the defendant not guilty on each of the first three counts and guilty
on the fourth count. The defendant appealed on the ground that the ver-
dicts on the several counts were inconsistent. Held (one judge dissenth ng)
that the conviction be sustained. Gozncr ?v. United States (1925, C. C. A.
6th) 9 F. (2d) 603.
It is well settled that in a civil action at common law a jury may at its
discretion return either a general or a special verdict. Railway v. Lasoitcr
(1909) 58 Fla. 234, 50 So. 428. The same rule applies in criminal actions.
Commonwealtk v. Chatham (1865) 50 Pa. St. 181; Clementson, Spccial
Verdicts (1905) 179. Statutory provisions making special verdicts man-
datory on the jury at the court's instruction do not apply to criminal cases.
People v. Marion (1874) 29 Mich. 32. At common law, and by statute
generally, the court may, in its discretion, either upon its own initiative or
upon proper request from counsel, submit special interrogatories to the
jury. Special findings, in response to these interrogatories, when incon-
sistent with the general verdict are controlling in civil suits. Richardon.
v. Weare (1882) 62 N. H. 80. But this is not so in criminal cases, as it
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seems to be against the policy of the law to apply any limitations on the
jury's privilege to render a general verdict in such cases. People v. Tess-
mer (1912) 171 Mich. 522, 137 N. W. 214. Each count in an indictment
is a distinct indictment, and, therefore, the finding of the jury as to a
particular count may with some plausibility be treated as independent of,
and unaffected by, the finding upon another count. Selvester v. United
States (1898) 170 U. S. 262, 18 Sup. Ct. 580. Hence while the verdicts on
the several counts may appear to be logically inconsistent, they are not
legally so. Grifn v. State (1868) 18 Ohio St. 438. It would seem that
the power of the court to set aside a conviction not sustained by the evi-
dence is considered a sufficient safeguard against abuse of the wider dis-
cretion given the jury in criminal cases. The instant decision is in accord
with the weight of authority. Marshallo v. United States (1924, C. C. A.
2d) 298 Fed. 74; Huffman v. United States (1919, C. C. A. 8th) 259 Fed.
35; contra: Rosenthal v. United States (1921, C. C. A. 9th) 276 Fed. 714.
EVIDENCE-HUSBAND AND WIFE-DEED OF SEPARATION ADMISSIBLE AS
EVIDENCE OF NON-AccEss.--A married couple entered into a deed of separa-
tion and lived apart for three years. At the end of this period the wife
gave birth to a child. The husband petitioned for a divorce on the ground
of adultery, and offered in evidence of non-access the deed of separation.
Held, that the deed was properly admitted in evidence, and that, since
there was no evidence to rebut the presumption which it created of non-
access, judgment be given for the plaintiff. Mart v. Mart (1925, Prob.)
42 T. L. R. 253.
The well established rule that a spouse is incompetent to testify as to
non-access when such testimony may bastardize a child of the marriage
had its inception in Lord Mansfield's emotional reaction (1) against allow-
ing indecent evidence as to private life and (2) against the "immorality"
of a wife's seeking to injure her child or of a husband's seeking to dis.
claim a child presumably his. Goodright v. Moss (1777, K. B.) Cowp. 591.
Both reasons, while conceivably proper in isolated cases, have failed to
justify its existence as a generally applicable rule. See 4 Wigmore, Evi-
dence (2d ed. 1923) sec. 2064. Adopting reason (1) it would seem that
while the spouse's testimony as to non-intercourse must be barred, either
spouse's testimony'as to the husband's absence at the time of conception
should be admitted. Such, however, has apparently not been the result,
Rex v. Sourton (1836, K. B.) 5 A. & El. 180; see Russell v. Russell [1924,
H. L.] A. C. 687, 698, 706; cf. Flint v. Pierce (1912, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 136
N. Y. Supp. 1056. But see Kennedy v. State (1915) 117 Ark. 113, 117,
173 S. W. 842, 843. And the most intimate details of family life are not
kept unexposed in divorce suits in which children are not so concerned.
Generally, therefore, emphasis has been laid solely on reason (2). See
Goodright v. Moss, supra, at 592; Melvin v. Melvin (1879) 58 N. 1-. 569,
570. The rule does not prevent a spouse from giving evidence that a
bastard child was born before the marriage. Janes' Estate. McDonald's
Appeal (1892) 147 Pa. 527, 23 Atl. 892 (testimony of mother). And it
has been held, by strict construction, that a judicial separation sufficiently
terminates the marriage to allow a parent's testimony to bastardize a
child conceived and born after the separation. Andrews v. Andrews and
Chalmers [1924] Prob. 255. The decision in the instant case may be
justified on the ground that a deed of separation in similar manner suf-
ficiently ends the marriage. The distinction made in the application of
the rule in cases of coverture is obviously technical for to bastardize issue
after separation is certainly not more moral than to do the same time
during coverture. What is probably the most sane (though not entirely
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satisfactory) explanation of the rule is of recent origin: to allow a spouse
to introduce before a jury evidence as to intercourse-something within
the sole knowledge of the married couple-is to put too strong a weapon
(blackmail) in the spouse's hands. If the evidence has to do with ab-
sence, however, third parties can almost always be found to testify as to it.
See Lord Dunedin in Russell v. Russcll supra, 120 ff. Adopting this ex-
planation, the conception of the immorality of bastardizing issue is dropped
out, and hence the court in the instant case properly gave free rein to the
presumption of non-access. See, generally, Thayer, Cascs on Evidec
(MaGuire's ed. 1925) 237 note; (1925) 2 CAMB. L. JOLT. 233.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-POSSIBILITY OF BLRMED W OAN AcQuUI1G SCMA-
RATE DomicIL FROM THAT OF HER HUSBAND.-The plaintiff had sued in
Alberta for a judicial separation. Both spouses were resident in Alberta
at the time the decree was granted. The subsequent whereabouts of the
husband became unknown. Later the plaintiff instituted this suit for
divorce in Alberta and obtained leave for substituted service on her hus-
band at his last known address within the jurisdiction. The husband's
domicile of origin was Ontario which was never changed. The trial court
dismissed the petition on the grounds that, since the domicile of the wife
was the same as that of the husband, the Alberta court had no jurisdic-
tion to dissolve the marriage. This decision was reversed on appeal and
a decree for dissolution of the marriage entered. Held, on appeal, that
the judgment of the intermediate court be reversed and the judgment of
the trial court restored. Attorney-Gencral for Alberta v. Cool: (1926, P. C.)
161 L. T. 314.
The old common law rule was that a married woman could not under
any circumstances or for any purpose, establish an independent domicile
from that of her husband. Yelvertoa v. Ycleerton (1859) 1 Sw. & Tr.
574; Dicey, Conflict of Laws (3rd ed. 1922) 127. The basis for the rule
was that, in law, man and wife were one. 1 Blackttone, Cownetarzo,
*442. But dicta in some later English cases pointed to some relaxation
of the rule. So it was intimated that where there had been a judicial
separation obtained by the wife, she could have an independent domicile.
See Dolphin v. Robins (1S59) 7 H. L. C. 390, 418. Also, where the hus-
band afforded the wife grounds for a divorce or judicial separation. See
Le Sueur v. Le Sue'r (1876) 1 P. D. 139, 142; overruled by Lord Advocate
v. Jaffrey [1921] 1 A. C. 146. Some English colonial courts have held
that the wife's domicile did not follow the husband's in a case where the
wife had obtained a judicial separation. Hastings v. Hastings [1922]
N. Z. L. R. 273; Protopsaltis v. Protopsaltis [1918] Queensland St. R.
270. The instant case appears to complete the return to the common law
rule. However, American courts, perhaps influenced by the rising popular
demand for equal rights for both sexes appear to have reached a stage of
development where they allow the wife an independent domicile. It is
necessary that the wife have the intent to acquire a domicile in the fixed
abode which she selects. Barrow v. Barrow (1926, La.) 106 So. 705; Do
Bouchel v. Candler (1924, N. D. Ga.) 296 Fed. 482. Also that she is with-
out fault amounting to desertion. Loker v,. Gerald (1892) 157 Mass. 42,
31 N. E. 709. Thus a wife can establish an independent domicile under the
following circumstances. (a) Where husband and wife have agreed to
live apart permanently. Licht v. Licht (1914, Sup. Ct.) 88 Misc.
107, 150 N. Y. Supp. 643; Bucldlolz -v. Bchholz (1911) 63 Wash.
213, 115 Pac. 88. (b) Where a judicial separation has been granted.
Miller v. Miller (1925, Iowa) 206 N. W. 262; Humphrcys v. Hu-mphrcys
(1924, Va.) 123 S. E. 554. (c) Where the husband, by misconduct, has
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given grounds for divorce or separation. Jenness v. Jenncss (1865) 24
Ind. 355; Ditson v. Ditson (1856) 4 R. I. 87. In any such cases the wife
is at liberty to establish her independent domicile elsewhere than at the
domicile of the husband at the time of his misconduct. Dean v. Dean
(1925) 241 N. Y. 240, 149 N. E. 844 (husband deserted wife in Ontario
and subsequently domiciled in Pa.; wife became domiciled in N. Y. where
she obtained divorce). Formerly, the independent domicile was thought to
be available only in litigation involving the marital status. See Barber
v. Barber (1858, U. S.) 21 How. 582, 594. But later cases have indicated
that the independent domicile exists for all purposes. White V. Glover
(1909, Sup. Ct., Tr. T.) 116 N. Y. Supp. 1059 (jurisdiction by substituted
service on wife as defendant in civil action) ; Watertown v. Greaves (1901,
C. C. A. 1st) 112 Fed. 183 (jurisdiction of federal court in tort action on
ground of diversity of citizenship); In re Crosby's Estate (1914, Surro.)
85 Misc. 679, 148 N. Y. Supp. 1045 (tax on wife's property); In re
Florance's Will (1889, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 54 Hun, 328, 7 N. Y. Supp. 578
(probate of will). Concededly it is socially desirable to preserve the factual
unity of the family. The court in the instant case, in saying that there
still remain all the disabilities attendant upon coverture except those ex-
pressly removed by statute, doubtless felt bound by the merely logical im-
plications of the old view that husband and wife "are one." Insofar as
the application of the rule in this case may be expected to coerce such
unity, it probably fails of its purpose. The tendency of the American
courts, therefore, in recognizing the logical possibility of a wife having
a domicile separate from that of her husband in certain circumstances,
seems much sounder social policy.
JUDGMENTS-RES ADJUDICATA-RECOVERY UNDER WORKM ;EN'S COMPENSA-
TIo" AcT BARs SUIT UNDER FEDERAL AcT.-The plaintiff's intestate was
killed while in the employ of the defendant. Plaintiff sued in the federal
court under the Employers' Liability Act for the sole benefit of the stir-
viving widow. The defendant pleaded a judgment recovered in the state
court under the Workmen's Compensation Act by the widow in her own
right, as sole beneficiary. The lower court gave judgment for the plaintiff
on the ground that there was no identity of parties. 'Held, on appeal, that
the judgment be reversed. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. v. Schendel
(1926) U. S. Sup. Ct. Oct. Term, 1925, No. 683.
The Supreme Court, in the instant case, in effect overruled the holding
of the Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of Dennison v. Payne (1923,
C. C. A. 2d) 293 Fed. 333, where the same question was raised. For ad-
verse criticism of Dennison case, see (1924) 33 YAIE LAW JOUnNAL, 326;
contra: (1924) 37 HARv. L. REv'. 778; cf. Troxell v. Delaware, L. & TV.
R.R. Co. (1913) 227 U. S. 434, 33 Sup. Ct. 274. The court correctly lays
the emphasis upon the identity of the cais of action as contrasted with
the right of action. See Clark, The Code Cause of Action (1924) 33 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 817; Phillips, Code Pleading (1896) see. 30 et seq. And
properly refuses to let the mere technical difference in identity of parties
prevent merger of the rights of action, since the only person benefited is
the same in each case. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Wulf (1913) 226
U. S. 570, 33 Sup. Ct. 135; Wilson v. Denver & R. G. R.R. Co. (1920) 69
Colo. 105, 187 Pac. 1027; cf. Chand, Res Judicata (1894) 180, 182; 2 Black,
Judgments (1891) sec. 610.
LIITATION OF ACTIONS-CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER EpIPLoyEns' LIABILITy
ACT HELD TO AccRUE AT DATE OF DEATH.-The plaintiff's intestate died
from injuries on April 23, 1921. Nearly seven years after the death, but
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less than two years after his appointment as administrator, the plaintiff
sued under the Employers' Liability Act, Act of April 22, 1903 (35 Stat.
at L. 65, 66) as amended by Act of April 5, 1910 (36 Stat. at L. 291).
Section 6 of the Act provided that no action could be maintained under
this Act "unless commenced within two years from the day the cause of
action accrued." The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided that the
cause of action accrued within the meaning of the Act at the time of the
administrator's appointment and not at the date of the death, and so gave
judgment for the plaintiff. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be re-
versed, on the ground that the cause of action accrued when the events
occurred which determined the defendants responsibility. Reading Co.,
etc., v. Koons (1926) Supreme Court of the United States, Oct. Term,
1925, No. 213.
In the instant case the Supreme Court for the first time directly decided
a question on which there has been much conflict of authority. A number
of state and federal courts have interpreted the limitation provision in
the Federal Act to mean that the cause of action accrued upon the ap-
pointment of the administrator, and not at the time of death, since only
the legal representative may sue. Davis v. Gray (1925, C. C. A. 1st) 8
Fed. (2d) 843; Bird v. Fort Worth & R. G. Ry. Co. (1913) 109 Tex. 323,
207 S. W. 518; Tiffany, Death by Wrongful Act (2d ed. 1013) sec. 122;
(1925) 9 MINN. L. REv. 282; (1914) 47 L. R. A. (N. s.) G7, note. But
where cause of action is defined as the operative facts which give rise
to the right of action, the courts reach the opposite result. Loularille &
N. Ry. Co. v. Sbanrall's Admr. (1907) 127 Ky. 55, 104 S. W. 1011; Clark,
The Code Cause of Action (1924) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 817, 823; COm-
=NTs (1925) 34 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 432. The court in the instant ease
expressly adopts this interpretation. See (1925) 34 YAu. Lw JOURNAL,
450, advocating this construction.
MoNOPOLES-AGREE ENTS IN RESTRAINT Or TRADE.-The defendant sold
goods to various retailers with a warning that if a certain price were not
maintained, sales would not be made to them in the future. Suit was
brought on the ground that this violated the Sherman Act (U. S. Comp.
Sts. 1916, sec. 8820). Held, that the bill be dismissed, there being no
agreements in restraint of trade. United States v. Hudnut (1925, S. D.
N. Y.) 8 Fed. (2d) 1010.
Most cases seem to hold, in accord with the instant case, that a mere
warning that there will be a refusal to sell, unless a fixed resale price is
complied with, is not against public policy at common law, nor within the
Sherman Act. Dunn, Resale Price Maintenance (1922) 32 YAw. LAWr
JOURNAL, 676; United States v,. Colgate (1919) 250 U. S. 300, 39 Sup. Ct.
465. But agreements which restrict the resale price are considered in-
valid under the Sherman Act and also at common law, on the theory that
they "qualify the vendee's title." Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John Park Co.
(1911) 220 U. S. 373, 31 Sup. Ct. 376; Coke, Littleton 030. However,
other courts refuse to make this distinction, and enforce such agreements
unless the producers are thereby given control of the whole, or too great
a part of any one commodity, or attempt such control by agreement with
other producers. Fsher Flouring Mis Co. v. Swanson. (1913) 76 Wash.
649, 137 Pac. 144; Ghirardelli Co. v. Hunsickcr (1912) 164 Calif. 355, 12
Pac. 1041. Ellizan v,. Carrington (1901) 2 Ch. 275. Thus it seems that
the legality turns upon the method used (restriction contracts or refusal
to sell) rather than upon the result attained, for one method seems to be
about as effective as the other in maintaining a uniform price. Dunn,
op. cit. 693. It would seem, however, that regardless of the method em-
ployed, the test should be whether the restraint is conducive to monopoly.
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Applying this test, restraint with regard to a particular brand only, as in
the instant case, might very well not be considered contrary to public
policy. See Fisher Flouring Mills Co. v. Swanson, supra, at 656, 137 Pac.
at 148.
PATENTS-JURISDICTION-JOINDER BY LICENSEE OF NON-RESIDENT PATEN-
TEE AS Co-PLAINTIFF WITHOUT His CONSENT.-The owner of a patent gave
the plaintiff an exclusive license to make, use and sell the patented devices,
reserving to itself "non-exclusive, non-transferable and personal rights"
to make, use and sell them for specified purposes. The defendant in-
fringed plaintiff's rights under the license, and plaintiff brought suit for
an injunction and damages. The owner of the patent, a non-resident, was
made a party plaintiff without his consent. The bill was dismissed by
the District Court on the ground that the owner must be made a party to
the suit by process. This ruling was reversed by the Circuit Court. Hold,
on certiorari, that the decree of the Circuit Court be affirmed. Independent
Wireless Telegraph. Co. v. Radio Corporation of America (1926) 46 Sup.
Ct. 166.
Where the owner transfers the entire patent, or an undivided interest
therein, the transfer, if it covers the entire country, is technically an
"assignment," and if limited to a particular territory, a "grant." Walker,
Patents (5th ed. 1917) secs. 274, 287. By statute, the "assignee" or
"grantee" may sue infringers in his own name. U. S. Rev. Sts. 1873, sec.
4919. Any other transfer is a mere "license." Gayler v. Wilder (1850,
U. S.) 10 How. 477. At law, the licensee can sue infringers, but he must
do so in the name of the owner. Goodyear v. McBurney (1853, C. C. S. D.
N. Y.) 3 Blatchf. 32. The owner appears to be a nominal plaintiff and
need not be a party by process. Goodyear v. Bishop (1860, C. C. S. D.
N. Y.) 4 Blatchf. 438. But, in suits in equity, it seems that the licensee
must join the owner as co-plaintiff. Waterran v. MacKenzie (1890) 138
U. S. 252, 11 Sup. Ct. 334. If the owner refuses to join, he may be made
a party upon personal service. Hurd v. Goold (1913, C. C. A. 2d) 203
Fed. 998. Moreover, the instant case allows him to be joined, upon his
refusal, even where he is a non-resident and cannot be personally served.
This is in accord with earlier federal decisions. Brush-Swau Electric Light
Co. v. Thomson-Houston Electric Co. (1891 C. C. Conn.) 48 Fed. 224;
Brush Electric Co. v. California Electric Co. (1892, C. C. A. 9th) 52 Fed.
945. The reason assigned for requiring joinder is that the infringer
might be subjected to two suits, if all the parties having an interest in the
patent were not joined. See Gayler v. Wilder, supra, at 495. Joining him
in the instant case, would, therefore, seem to be a mere formality-lilke
the use at common law of the name of the assignor of a chose in action
in a suit by the assignee-for the owner here retains merely a personal
and non-exclusive privilege which interest was not infringed. However,
an owner of a patent may retain some exclusive privileges, transferring
only part to the licensee. Cf. Blanchard v. Eldridge (1849, C. C. E. D. Pa.)
1 Wall. Jr. 337 (owner retained exclusive privilege to use device generally,
licensee to use it only in making shoes.) In such a case, if the licensee
were to sue alone, the alleged infringement might be found not to have
violated any of the licensee's special rights. Subsequent suit might then
be brought by the owner on his general rights. By requiring the owner
to be joined with the licensee, such possible multiplicity is avoided. This
result seems desirable where the owner has been personally served. But
the doctrine of the instant case, if extended to allow all patent owners
to be made party plaintiffs in suits brought by their licensees, would allow
the owners' possible claims for infringements to be determined even though
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they are non-residents and have not been personally served. Unless the
courts are willing to regard such determination as a proceeding in rcm,
which is doubtful, it would seem violative of the requirements of due proc-
ess. Cf. Pennoyer v. .Neff (1877) 95 U. S. 714.
PROPERTY-OBSTRUCTION OF VIEW FROM STRET TO SHOW WINDow.-The
defendant, licensed by city officials, erected an awning in front of its build-
ing which adjoined that of the plaintiff. This awning obstructed the view
from Fifth Avenue to the plaintiff's window display on Forty-ninth Street.
The plaintiff sought to enjoin the maintenance of the awming and to recover
damages. Held, that an injunction be granted and that damages be
awarded on the ground that the plaintiff had a right that the view from
the street to the show window be not obstructed. Brown-Brand Realty
Company v. Saks & Company (1926, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 126 Mlisc. 326.
The right of an owner of land on a public street to access, light, and air
from the street is well recognized. Rigncy v. City of Chicago (1831) 102
Ill. 64; O'Brien v. Central Iron & Steel Co. (1902) 158 Ind. 218, 63 N. E.
302 (access); Lahr v. Metropolitan Elerated Railroad Co. (1887) 104 N. Y.
268, 10 N. E. 523; Field v. Barling (1894) 149 Ill. 556, 37 N. E. 850 (light
and air). These are property rights and the city cannot lawfully au-
thorize a permanent obstruction which impairs them without compensation.
Story v. New York Elev'ated Railroad Co. (1882) 90 N. Y. 122. An unob-
structed view from the street to the show window has become as necessary
to the beneficial enjoyment of business property as access and light from
the street. The instant case, therefore, seems sound in extending the old
doctrine to meet new conditions and is supported by decisions. Mont-
gomery First National Bank v. Tyson (1902) 133 Ala. 459, 32 So. 14.4;
Williams v. Los Angeles Railway Co. (1907) 150 Calif. 592, 89 Pac. 030;
Hallock v. Scheyer (1884, N. Y.) 33 Hun, 111; contra: Szith v.. Owca
(1866) 35 L. J. Ch. (0. S.) 317; Hay v. Weber, (1891) 79 Wis. M57, 48
N. W. 859; cf. Wormser v. Brown (1896) 149 N. Y. 103, 43 N. E. 521
(obstruction of view from window of residence to street held not actionable
as damage was inconsiderable).
REAL PROPERT--REsTRAINTS ON ALIENATION-COVENANT IN Lass N0T
To PART WITH Poss-ssio. -The defendant lessee covenanted with his
lessor not to "assign, underlet, part with possession, or otherwise dispose
of the premises or any part thereof" without the written consent of the
latter. Subsequently, the defendant, without such consent, assigned his
business to a company of which he was the managing director. By stipula-
tion, the defendant retained possession although the company conductell
the business on the demised premises. The plaintiff brought an action for
breach of covenant and recovered. Held, that the judgment be reversed
as the defendant had not paited with possession. Chaplin v. Smith (1925,
C. A.) 134 L. T. R. 393.
In order for a party to be in possession of real property he must have
the intent to control plus the ability to exclude others. Holmes, The Coz-
mon Law (1881) 216, 220; Pollock and Wright, Possession in the Cosnn
Law (1888) 20. While the defendant's conduct in the instant case falls
within the definition of possession, what occurred seems to have been ex-
actly that contingency against which the lessor took precaution to provide
in the lease. Where restrictive covenants are incorporated into a lease,
the general rule of interpretation is that they should be so construed as
to carry into effect the intent of the parties. Croft v. Lunzly (1853, Q. B.)
6 H. L. Cas. 672; Kerley -e. Mayer (1895, C. P.) 10 Misc. 718, 31 N. Y.
Supp. 818. But restrictions in leases against assignments, subletting, and
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giving up of possession, like other restraints on alienation, are regarded
with disfavor. Gray, Restraints on the Alienation of Property (2d ed.
1895) secs. 4, 5, 27, 278. Of. Church v. Brom (1808, Ch.) 15 Ves. 258;
Gazlay v. Williams (1906, C. C. A. 6th) 147 Fed. 678; Wainwrightyht. Bank-
ers' Loan, etc., Co. (1911) 112 Va. 630, 72 S. E. 129. And such restraints
are not extended by implication. Jackson v. Silvernail (1818, N. Y.) 15
John. 278; Leduke v. Barnett (1881) 47 Mich. 158, 10 N. W. 182; Jackson
v. Simons [1923] 1 Ch. 373. This does not, however, prevent the lessor
from enforcing clearly expressed intentions included in restrictive covenants
against alienation. Greenslade v. Tapscott (1834, Exch.) 1 Cromp. Mees,
& Ros. 55; Varley v. Coppard (1872) L. R. 7 C. P. 505; Emery v. Hill
(1892) 67 N. H. 330, 39 Atl. 266. The instant case is interesting not
only in pointing out the court's preference to construe the lease to prevent
a restraint on alienation, but also in indicating a method to evade cove-
nants against parting with possession by mere compliance with the tech-
nical rules of possession. It is submitted that the holding of the lower
court would have more nearly carried out the intent of the parties.
TORTS-BRFACH Op CONTRACT--ILLEGAL INTRERENCE.-The plaintiffs,
manufacturers of tires, made an agreement with a motor car company
that whenever the latter sold or exhibited cars they would be fitted with
tires purchased from the plaintiffs. Cars thus equipped were sent for
exhibition purposes. Prior to the exhibit, the defendants, without author-
ity from the motor car company, removed the tires and substituted tires
of their own make which they desired to advertise. The plaintiff sued
defendant for causing a breach of contract. The lower court gave judg-
ment for the plaintiff, and defendant appealed. Held, that the judgment
be affirmed. G. W. K. Ltd. et al. v. Dunlop Rubber Co. Ltd. (1926, K. B.)
42 T. L. R. 376.
It is generally accepted that a tort action will lie for wilfully inducing a
third party to break a contract with the plaintiff. Lumley v. Gyc (1853,
Q. B.) 2 El. & Bl. 216; Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Gardiner Dairy Co. (1908)
107 Md. 556, 69 Atl. 405. But courts, apparently, have not extended this
doctrine to situations where the defendant has interfered with the per-
formance of a contract by acts not done for the purpose of inducing its
breach. Dale v. Grant (1870) 34 N. J. L. 142 (act of defendant causing
A to be unable to supply B with manufactured products according to con-
tract held not actionable by B); Kokomo Rubber Co. v. Anderson (1924)
33 Ga. App. 241, 125 S. E. 783 (holding over by tenant causing lessor's
breach of contract with reversioner held not actionable). However, the inter-
ference with the consummation of an expected contract by means of fraud
or intimidation has been held actionable. Lewis v. Bloede (1912, C. C. A.
4th) 202 Fed. 7; Krigbaum v. Sbarbaro (1913) 23 Cal. App. 427, 138 Pac.
364. From this it would seem to follow that an action should lie for an
unauthorized interference with the performance of already existing con-
tracts. Moreover, an expectancy of profit is protected against wilful and
unjustifiable interference. Keeble v. Hickeringill (1809, K. B.) 11 East,
574; Kiernan v. Metropolitan Const. Co. (1898) 170 Mass. 378, 49 N. E.
648; Tuttle v. Buck (1909) 107 Minn. 145, 119 N. W. 946; Hutton 'V.
Watters (1915) 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S. W. 134. In the instant case, it is
possible that the defendant, by interfering with the plaintiff's advertising,
injured plaintiff's expectancy of business. And competition would not be
a justification for such interference for the defendant resorted to force
and fraud. Doremus v. Hennesy (1898) 176 Ill. 608, 52 N. E. 924; Dunsheo
v. Standard Oil Co. (1911) 152 Iowa, 618, 132 N. W. 371; see Mogul S. S.
Co. v. McGregor (1889) L. R. 23 Q. B. D. 598, 614.
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ToRTs-CoNvERsIoN-sPoNsmIILT or AGa=T.-The defendant express
,company, being engaged by the N. K. K. Company to forward to Japan cer-
tain steel which was expected to arrive at Seattle by railroad, delivered lists
to the steamship company showing the number of the cars in which the steel
was expected. The railroad company erroneously entered on its boolm the
numbers of the cars containing the plaintiff's steel as being consigned to
the N. K. K. Company. The steamship company, noticing a discrepancy
in the car numbers, refused to accept shipment without the defendant's
assurance that the steel belonged to the N. K. K. Company. The defend-
ant and a representative of the N. K. K. Company inspected the steel, and,
relying on the opinion of the latter, the defendant ordered it to be trans-
ferred to the ship. The steel was shipped to Japan and the plaintiff sued
for conversion. Judgment was given for the plaintiff. Held, on appeal,
that the judgment be affirmed. Suzrui v. Small, as Presidcnt of the Amcnr-
an Express Co. (1925, 1st Dept.) 214 App. Div. 541.
In the English case of Hollins v. Fowler (1875, H. L.) 33 L. T. R. (N.S.)
73, it was held that an agent who purchases goods from a convertor, tahes
possession of the goods and transfers them to his principal, is a con-
vertor. This view has been followed by American courts. WillianzS v.
Merle (1833, N. Y.) 11 Wend. 80; Flannery v. Harley (1903) 117 Ga. 483,
43 S. E. 765; contra: Levthold v. Fairchild (186) 35 Blinn. 99, 27 N. W.
503, 28 N. W. 218. Likewise, in England, it has been held that an agent
-who at his principal's direction, takes possession of goods without the true
owner's consent, and transfers them to his principal pursuant to a sale
by the purported owner, is guilty of a conversion. Stephens v. Elwell
(1815) 4 M. & S. 259; contra: cf. National Mercantile Bank Ltd. v. Ry-
ill (1881, C. A.) 44 L. T. R. (N.S.) 767. However, American courts
Tefuse to hold that a mere dealing with possession is a converzion and
hence decline to follow this view. Bardett v. Hu'nt (1845) 25 Bte. 419;
Strickland v. Barrett (1838, Blass.) 20 Pick. 415; see Thorp v. Burling
(1814, N. Y.) 11 Johns 285, 286, 287; Smith v. Colby (1373) 67 Me. 169,
171; Mead v. Jack (1883, N. Y.) 12 Daly 65, 69. In the instant case, (con-
sidering the defendant as a link in the chain of transportation) had the
plaintiff's steel been shipped in cars originally consigned to the N. K. K.
Company, the defendant would not have been a convertor under the Ameri-
can view, because this too would have been a mere dealing with possession.
Cf. Gurley v. Armstead (1889) 148 Mass. 267, 19 N. E. 389. But since
the defendant's attention was called to the possibility of the railroad hav-
ing delivered the plaintiff's steel, if the defendant, in ordering shipment
passed upon the title of the steel and took possession, this determination
would render him a convertor. Thorp v. Burling, supra; Mead v. Jac?:,
szpra; La Touche v. Simpson (1913) 85 N. J. L. 149, 88 At]. 945. How-
ever, in the instant case, the defendant's determination rested upon the
statement of a representative of the principal. Hence it becomes a ques-
tion of fact whether the defendant or the principal exercised the "dominion."
If it was the latter, the instant case would seem to be an application of the
doctrine of Stephens v. Elwell, supra, which American courts purport not
to follow.
ToRTs-LIEI.--ExTnINsIc FACTS MBL= NnWsPRu'ra AnR=CL AcTiornm
PER sn.The defendant published a newspaper article stating that the
plaintiff as the latest "ladylove" of "Fatty" Arbuckle and that there was a
reported "match" between them. The lower courts held that the article
was not libelous per se. Held, on appeal (two judges dissenting) that the
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matter was libelous per se, since it appeared by extrinsic evidence that
the plaintiff was a married woman. Sydney v. MacFadden Newspaper Pub.
Corp. (1926) 242 N. Y. 208, 151 N. E. 209.
It is well settled that written defamation may be actionable without
proof of special damage. Thorley v. Lord Kerry (1812 Exch. Ch.) 4 Taunt.
355; Odgers, Libel and Slander (5th ed. 1911) 377. Thus, any printed
article which is false and tends to expose the plaintiff to public contempt,
-ridicule or disgrace is libelous per se. Triggs v. Sun Printing & Pub. Asso.
(1904) 179 N. Y. 144, 71 N. E. 739. But the language used is sometimes
ambiguous, or its defamatory character latent. Odgers, op. cit. 119. Un-
der these circumstances, the plaintiff must allege in his complaint the ex-
trinsic facts which establish the libelous nature of the article. Van Heusen
v. Argenteau (1909) 194 N. Y. 309, 87 N. E. 437; Kee v. Armstrong (1919)
75 Okla. 84, 182 Pac. 494. The dissent in the instant case is based upon
earlier New York decisions to the effect that if the publication is not libelous
without the aid of extrinsic facts, special damages must also be alleged.
O'Connell v. Press Pub. Co. (1915) 214 N. Y. 352, 108 N. E. 556. Accord
in other jurisdictions. See Tonini v. Cevasco (1896) 114 Calif. 266, 271,
46 Pac. 103, 104; Wiley v. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. (1925) 106 Okla. 52,
54, 233 Pac. 224, 225. The effect of such holding is that "language cannot
-Zbe held to be libelous per se when it is necessary to examine extrinsic facts
alleged to give the language a libelous meaning." See Brodek v. Jones
(1925, 1st Dept.) 212 App. Div. 247, 252, 208 N. Y. Supp. 699, 704. But the
court in still earlier New York decisions, as well as courts of other juris-
dictions, have found articles libelous per se in consideration of the surround-
ing circumstances. Morey v. Morning Journal (1890) 123 N. Y. 207, 25
N. E. 161 (news item that plaintiff is threatened with suit for breach of
promise to marry, when plaintiff is a married man); Gates v. New York
Recorder Co. (1898) 155 N. Y. 228, 49 N. E. 769; (news item that plaintiff
was once a concert-hall singer and dancer at Coney Island, when the neigh-
borhood considered that concert-hall singers and dancers at Coney Island
were a disreputable class); Upton v. Times-Democrat (1900) 104 La. 141,
28 So. 970 (news item that plaintiff is a negro, when plaintiff is white);
Morrison v. Ritchie (1902, Ct. of Sess.) 39 Scot. Law Rep. 432 (announce-
ment of the birth of twins to plaintiffs, when they have only been married
a month); see Stannard v. Wilcox Sewing Machine Co. (1912) 118 Md.
151, 158, 84 At. 335, 338 (imputation of a want of credit, when plaintiff
requires credit in his business). The article is to be construed as it would
ordinarily be understood by the reading public. Turton v. New York
Recorder Co. (1894) 144 N. Y. 144, 38 N. E. 1009; cf. Klumph v. Dunn
(1870) 66 Pa. 141. It would, therefore, seem that the court should con-
sider the surrounding circumstances, of which the readers may be aware,
e. g., as members of the same community as the plaintiff. Such is the rule
in England. Odgers, op. cit. 133; Williams v. Smith (1889) L. R. 22 Q. B.
134; Monson v. Tussands, Ltd. (1894) L. R. 1 Q. B. 671. It is suggested
by the dissent that the notorious reputation of "Fatty" Arbuckle should be
a circumstance for judicial notice, as well as the fact that plaintiff is a mar-
ried woman. The gravamen of libel is injury to the plaintiff's reputation.
See McLoughlin v. American Circular Loom Co. (1903, C. C. A. 1st) 125
Fed. 203, 205. The injury follows, whether the libel is unequivocal, or
whether the defamatory character of the language is revealed by extrinsic
circumstances known to the public. Hence the requirement of an allega-
tion of special damages in order to recover on a publication which is libelous,
though by virtue of extrinsic facts, seems anomalous. It is essentially
defamatory, and consequently distinguishable from a malicious falsehood,
for which recovery depends upon proof of malice and actual damage. Rat-
1022
RECENT CASE NOTES
cliffe v. Evans (1892) L. R. 2 Q. B. 524; see Morasse z,. Brochu (1890) 151
Mlass. 567, 574, 25 N. E. 74, 77.
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-CHIROPRACTORS-VIOLkTION OF STATUTE REQUI=G
LICENSE TO PRACTICE MIEDICIN.-The plaintiff sued the defendant for in-
juries resulting from improper chiropractic treatment. The defendant had
not taken an e-xamination for procuring a license as required of all medical
practitioners by statute. The lower court charged the jury that the viola-
tion of the statute was some evidence of negligence. Judgment was given
for the plaintiff. Held, on appeal (two judges dissoenting) that the judg-
ment be reversed on the ground that the violation of the statute warranted
no inference of negligence. Brown. v. Shync (1926) 242 N. Y. 176, 151
N. E. 197.
Osteopaths, like Christian Science healers, are generally not treated as
practitioners of medicine. People '. Gordon (1902) 194 Ill. 560, 62 N. E.
858; People v. Cole (1916) 219 N. Y. 93, 113 N. E. 790. Thus in New Yorl:
there is a special provision for licensing osteopaths. Cahill's N. Y. Cons.
Laws 1923, ch. 46, sec. 173. But there is in New York no statutory pro-
vision for licensing chiropractors as such. They seem to be regarded in
New York and by most courts as ordinary physicians within the meaning
of the licensing statutes, and are liable to prosecution if not licensed. Peo-
ple v. Ellis (1914) 162 App. Div. 288, 147 N. Y. S. 681; Commonwealth v.
Zimmennan (1915) 221 Mass. 184, 108 N. E. 893; Swarts v. Siveny (1912)
35 R. I. 1, 85 Atl. 33; contra: State v. Gallagher (1912) 101 Ark. 593, 143
S. W. 98; L. R. A. 1917, C. 823, note; Green v. Hodges (1914) 91 Kan. 653,
(special board of examiners in Kansas). In tort eaes the violation of a
statute is material in determining the defendant's responsibility where the
injury is of the character the legislature desired to prevent. Gorris v.
Scoft (1874) L. R. 9 Exch. 125; Platz v. City of Cohocs (1882) 89 N. Y.
220. The individual injured must be within the class for whose benefit the
statute was passed. Parker v. Barnard (1883) 135 Mass. 116; Taylor v.
R. R. (1881) 45 Mich. 74. The violation mnust also be the proximate cause
of the injury. Corbett v. Spanos (1918) 37 Calif. App. 200, 173 Pac. 769.
Some courts hold that the violation of a statute is merely some evidence of
negligence. Bourne v. Whitman (1911) 209 Mass. 155, 95 N. E. 404 (driv-
ing automobile without a license); but cf. Atl. C. L. P. R. v. Weir (1912)
63 Fla. 69, 58 So. 641 (licensing statute construed as revenue measure);
Couch v. Steel (1854) 3 E. & B. 402 (statute requiring medicine to be
kept on vessel); People v. Meyer (1924, 2d Dept.) 209 App. Div. 903, 205
N. Y. Supp. 943, aff'd 239 N. Y. 608, 147 N. E. 216 (memorandum decision,
criminal prosecution for manslaughter-cited by the dissent in the instant
case to the effect that violation of the statute was some evidence of criminal
negligence). Other courts hold that it is prima facie evidence of negligence.
U. S. Brewing Co. v. Stoltenberg (1904) 211 Ill. 531, 71 N. E. 1031. It has
been suggested that under these views the jury is allowed to substitute
its judgment as to what is negligence for that of the legislature. See
Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action (1913) 27 Hnv. L. REv. 317,
322. Accordingly most courts hold that such violations are negligence "per
se" i.e., statutory fault. Martin v. Herzog (1920) 228 N. Y. 104, 126 N. E.
814; Osborne v. McMasters (1889) 40 Blinn. 103, 41 N. W. 543 (sale of
unlabeled poisons); Goodwin v. Rowe (1913) 67 Or. 1, 135 Pac. 171 (un-
registered druggist); Meshbesher v. Channdlene (1909) 107 Blinn. 104,
119 N. W. 428 (sale in violation of pure food statute). While the instant
decision may be sound in holding the violation no evidence of negligence,
nevertheless, it would seem that the defendant should have been held re-
sponsible on the ground of statutory fault, since, as the dissent suggested,
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the obvious purpose of the statute was to protect patients from incompetent
practitioners.
ToRTs-TRESPASSER ON THE HIGHWAY-ILLEGAL OPERATION OF BUSSES
AS A BAR TO RECOVERY FOR NEGLIGENE.-Plaintiff sued for recovery for
damages to his bus caused by a collision due to the defendant's negligence.
The bus was operated on a certain route without a franchise under an
invalid permit from the Department of Plant and Structures of the City
of New York. A judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed in the Appellate
Term and appealed from by the defendant. Held, that the jfidgment be
reversed since the plaintiff was a trespasser on the highway. Klinkcnstein
v. Third Avenue Railroad Go. (1926, N. Y. App. Div. 1st Dept.) April 9,
1926, 75 N. Y. L. JouR. No. 8.
The problem involved is whether lawful users of the highway are under
any duty to use care toward those whose presence is forbidden-trespassers
on the highway. In the analogous situation of unregistered motor vehicles
(which are prohibited from using the roads) being damaged by the negli-
gent use of other vehicles, courts have held generally that the violation of
the statute did not prevent recovery because the plaintiff's violation of the
law was no part of the proximate cause of the injury. Birmingham By.
Light & Power Co. v. Aetna Accident and Liability Co. (1913) 184 Ala.
601, 64 So. 44; Moore v. Hart (1916) 171 Ky. 725, 188 S. W. 861. Massa-
chusetts, however, has applied a rule similar to the one in the instant case,
that the owner or driver has no rights except that he shall not be reck-
lessly or wantonly injured. Dudley v. Northampton Street By. Co. (1909)
202 Mass. 443, 89 N. E. 25; Dean v. Boston Elevated By. Co. (1914) 217
Mass. 495, 105 N. E. 616. This rule, however, is not applied in the case
of unlicensed chauffeurs. Bourne v. Whitman (1911) 209 Mass. 155, 95
N. E. 404; Clark v. Doolittle (1923, 4th Dept.) 205 App. Div. 697, 199 N. Y.
Supp. 814. The Sunday Laws prohibiting travel except "from necessity
or charity" raise the same problem. The majority of courts have held
that violation of these statutes is not a bar to the plaintiff's recovery, even
for damage due to failure to repair the roads, since such violation was not
a proximate cause of the injury. Platz v. City of Cohoes (1882) 89
N. Y. 219; Sutton v. Town of Wauwatosa (1871) 29 Wis. 21; Jordon v.
N. Y., N. H., & H. By. Co. (1896) 165 Mass. 346, 43 N. E. 111 (express
statutory provision, although formerly Massachusetts held contra, Smitk
v. Boston and Maine By. (1876) 120 Mass. 490). In a few states those
violating the Sunday Laws and the law against the use of unregistered
motor vehicles have been considered trespassers; but, in those jurisdic-
tions, a distinction has been drawn'between the duty owed by the state or
its agent to keep the highway safe, and the duty owed by other travellers
to use care toward those on the highway, recovery being allowed in the
latter class of cases. McCarthy v. Inhabitants of the Town of Leeds
(1916) 115 Me. 134, 98 Atl. 72; Cobb v. Cumberland County Power & Light
Co. (1918) 117 Me. 455, 104 AtI. 844; Johnson v. Irasburghb (1874) 47 Vt.
28; Gilman v. Central Vermont By. Co. (1919) 93 Vt. 340, 107 At. 122.
This distinction is analogous to that drawn between (1) the absence of
duty to keep private premises safe for trespassers, and (2) the duty of
one engaged'in active conduct to use care toward a known trespasser. (1)
Union Stock Yards and Transit Co. v. Rourke (1881) 10 Ill. App. 474; (2)
Herrick v. Wixom (1899) 121 Mich. 384, 80 N. W. 117; Rome Furnace Co.
v. Patterson (1904) 120 Ga. 521, 48 S. E. 166; contra: Magar v. Hammond
(1906) 183 N. Y. 387 (holding no duty to refrain from inflicting wilful or
wanton harm); Hoberg v. Collins, Lavery & Co. (1910) 80 N. J. L. 425,
78 Atl. 166.
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TRUSTS-SPENDTHRIFT TRUST HELD NOT SuIBJEcT TO PAYMENT OF ALIMONY
TO THE DIVORCED WIFE oF THE BENEiCIA.-The plaintiff, the divorced wife
of the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust, petitioned for payment of alimony
out of the funds of the trust. The lower court granted the petition. The
trustee excepted. Held, on appeal, that the decree be set aside on the
ground that an award of alimony, being a judgment debt, could not be
satisfied out of the funds of a spendthrift trust. Eaton v. Eaton (1026,
N. H.) 132 Atl. 10.
Payment of alimony out of the funds of a spendthrift trust is generally
denied as contrary to the intention of the settlor. Tiaclara- . MNitzcr
(1882) 100 Pa. 151; (1925) 35 A. L. R. 1035, note. Similarly, it has been
held that a spendthrift trust may not be attached for the maintenance
of the undivorced wife, deserted by the beneficiary. Board of Charitiei v.
Lockwood (1901) 198 Pa. 572, 48 Atl. 49G. In an earlier litigation, the
particular trust involved in the instant case (created for the benefit of the
testator's son "as his needs may require") was construed to permit the use
of the funds for the support of the beneficiary's wife and child. Eaton,. v.
Lovering (1924) 81 N. H. 275, 125 AtI. 433. But the court in the instant
case refused to construe this trust as including a divorced wife. Obviously,
in jurisdictions where spendthrift trusts are not recognized, a trust for the
husband's benefit will be subject to attachment for alimony. roaztgoni:rj
v. Offutt (1909) 136 Ky. 157, 123 S. W. 676. A similar result is reached
where the trust is invalidly created. De Rozussc . William.- (1017) 181
Iowa, 379, 164 N. W. 896 (beneficiary gave consideration for establishment
of trust). Moreover, it has been held that in the absence of objection to
the decree by the beneficiary, the trustee of a spendthrift trust could be
compelled to pay the wife alimony where the decree for alimony so provided.
Hoagland v. Leask (1912, 1st Dept.) 154 App. Div. 101, 138 N. Y. Supp.
790 (affirmed without opinion (1915) 214 N. Y. 645, 103 N. E. 109G).
Where, by statute, creditors may attach any surplus of the trust income not
applied to the uses prescribed by the settlor, that surplus is also subject to
payment of alimony. Wetiiwrc v. Wetmore (1896) 149 N. Y. 520, 44 N. E.
169. But the ordinary remedies for enforcing an award of alimony must
first have been exhausted. Haisted v. Hastcd (1897, 1st Dept.) 21 App.
Div. 466, 47 N. Y. Supp. 649. In such cases, however, the duty to pay
alimony is considered more than a mere debt. See Wetmo c v. Wetmore,
svpra, at 528, 44 N. E. at 170. And, consequently, it seems that the di-
vorced wife will be given preference over other creditors. See Wetmore -e.
Wetmore, supra, at 529, 44 N. E. at 170. The husband's obligation to pay
alimony is not usually defined as a debt. See 2 Bishop, Mla;-iagc, Divorce
and Separation (1891) sec. 837. This obligation has been construed as not
being within constitutional provisions against imprisonment for debt. Tol-
nan v. Leonard (1895) 6 App. D. C. 224; Wight maa v. Wigkt tma (1867)
45 Ill. 167. So also, it has been held that the husband may not assert
against his obligation to pay alimony, a statutory exemption of homestead
lands from execution for debt. Mezwie v. Adcreon (1379) 65 Ind. 239.
Likewise, the assignment of half the interest of a trust income for the
support of a legally separated wife is not such an "alienation" of the trust
fund as is prohibited by statutes. In re Yards Estate (1921, Surro.) 116
Misc. 19, 189 N. Y. Supp. 190. Therefore, while the instant case is un-
doubtedly in accord with precedent on the particular issue, a contrary view
might seem to be justified by the policy which in other situations has tahen
alimony out of the category of mere debts.
